Unpacking the Habitus: Meaning Making Across Lifestyles[1]

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The concept of habitus refers to socially stratified patterns of perception, classification, and thinking that are supposed to bring about specific lifestyles. Until now, research on the links between stratification and lifestyles has accounted for the habitus mainly in conceptual and theoretical terms, and studies directly measuring habitus and its association with stratification and lifestyles are rare. The present study conceptualizes the habitus as an individual-level pattern of meaning making and suggests an operationalization that is commonly used in identity research. Using survey data of 3,438 respondents, the study investigates associations between different lifestyles and patterns of meaning making. Results show, first, that self-related meanings vary systematically across lifestyle categories and mirror respondents' stratification position. Second, the meanings of various social concepts also vary significantly across lifestyle categories and partly reflect descriptive lifestyle characteristics. In sum, the study presents a plausible operationalization of (parts of) the habitus and advances our understanding of its mediating position between stratification and lifestyles.

KEY WORDS: cognition; culture; habitus; identity; lifestyles; stratification.

INTRODUCTION

How do people's objective living conditions and positions in the social hierarchy affect their ways of life? In sociological terms, this translates into the question of how stratification and social class are linked to individuals' lifestyles. The classical and empirically well-substantiated answer is that the former are systematically linked to the latter. Objective living conditions are understood as enablers or constraints in developing and enacting different lifestyles. However, a proper understanding of the social mechanisms that bring about these links is lacking. In theory, Bourdieu's (1984) "habitus" has been suggested to provide such an explanation. It is supposed to encompass corporeal and psychological structures of perceiving, thinking, and feeling that are socially differentiated, for example by social class.

Likewise, it is supposed to be a "generative" structure producing class-specific patterns of behavior that manifest in distinct lifestyles practices.

Although there is a rich empirical literature on the intersections of lifestyles, social class, and status that has substantially advanced our understanding of the association between stratification and lifestyles (e.g., Petev 2013), this research is largely mute regarding the mechanisms that produce this association, in particular concerning the habitus. This might be due to the vagueness of the habitus concept itself (DiMaggio 1979; Jenkins 1992), the implausibility of its role in the reproduction of culture and social structure (Goldthorpe 2007), or because of both. We would add a third reason. The habitus, at least in Bourdieu's original understanding, seems notoriously difficult to operationalize using standardized measures, not least because of its tight coupling to social practices.

More recently, this situation has slightly changed, and some have proposed alternative understandings of the habitus using the perspective and terminology of the cognitive sciences, including cognitive sociology (Ignatow 2009; Lizardo 2004; Pickel 2005; Vaisey 2009). From this vantage point, the habitus is conceptualized primarily as an embodied and psychological pattern of meaning making that operates largely outside conscious awareness. If the habitus can indeed be thought of as a specific meaning-making structure, it should be accessible—at least in part—through some tools and techniques of meaning measurement (see Mohr 1998 for an overview), and it should be possible to relate such meaning-making structures to class-specific lifestyle practices. On the one hand, the proposed patterns of meaning making should be a consequence of individuals' positions in the social structure. On the other hand, their generative potential should manifest—in line with Bourdieu's ideas—in distinct practices as the building blocks of lifestyles that can be understood as *articulate* forms of meaning making.

The present study sets out to test this proposition. More specifically, we follow recent reinterpretations of the habitus, conceiving of it as an individual-level pattern of meaning making that can be (1) measured using the semantic differential technique and three basic dimensions of meaning making (evaluation, potency, and activity); that is (2) socially shared within stratified groups of individuals; and is (3) associated with lifestyle practices that are specific to these groups. We first discuss the nexus between lifestyles, habitus, and meaning making in more theoretical detail and suggest a technique of meaning measurement borrowed from identity theory, in particular versions based on structural symbolic interactionism. We then provide empirical support for our arguments using data from a nationwide survey of the German population that includes indicators of lifestyles and semantic differential measures of the meanings of various social concepts. We conclude by discussing and relating our findings to broader issues in the sociology of culture and stratification.

LIFESTYLES AND THE HABITUS

The ways in which people's objective living conditions and positions in a stratified society affect their ways of life have been of sociological concern since the discipline's inception. Interest in this relationship can be traced back to Durkheim's

theorizing on the links between social facts and the "milieu social," to Marx's idea of class conditions and class consciousness, to Weber's concept of *Lebensführung*, and to Simmel's notion of *Lebensstil*. In contemporary sociology, the common denominator for this relationship—at least in the English-speaking world—is the term *lifestyles*. The basic assumption is that objective material and immaterial living conditions promote specific patterns of behavior and a specific conduct of life (basically Weber's German term *Lebensführung*) (Weber 1956:531ff).[7]

Based on this groundwork, contemporary understandings of lifestyles have evolved along two pathways (see Sobel 1981; Zablocki and Kanter 1976). The first perspective emphasizes the voluntary, "subcultural," and identity-providing facets of different ways of life: for example, as a "green," "gay," or "alternative" lifestyle (e.g., Brekhus 2003). According to this understanding, lifestyles are primarily reflected in shared goals and preferences and specific identity-signaling behaviors as symbolic expressions of these preferences (e.g., regarding the consumption of apparel, music, or diet) and are not necessarily rooted in collectivities with an *otherwise* shared social or cultural identity: for instance, social classes or status groups (Zablocki and Kanter 1976:271).

The second perspective has more closely embraced the concepts and categories of stratification and inequality—for instance, class or status—and investigated their association with lifestyles (Chan 2010; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007a; Devine et al. 2005). Although lifestyles in this tradition also include shared goals, values, preferences, and patterns of meaning making and their symbolic ramifications, they primarily refer to these commonalities as a function of social stratification and in relation to stratified groups. This view conceives of lifestyles less as a freely chosen cluster of leisure behaviors or consumption preferences, and more as deeply socialized and embodied practices that are less fluid and less dynamic than the lifestyles that are driven by motives of identity construction and maintenance.

The conjecture inherent to the second perspective—namely, that lifestyles are closely associated with stratification—has spurred a lively debate over the conceptual distinctiveness of class, status, and lifestyles and the evidence regarding this association. Although many studies have documented robust, albeit not homologous, associations between class, status, and lifestyles, existing research has hardly ever addressed the precise *mechanisms* that link stratification to the social practices that actually bring about specific lifestyles. Furthermore, studies have yet mainly operationalized lifestyles as specific patterns of cultural consumption (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007b; Holt 1998; Jaeger and Katz-Gerro 2010; Petev 2013), paying less attention to underlying worldviews and patterns of meaning making and valuation.

One of the most frequently evoked mechanisms in explaining associations between class, status, and lifestyles is Bourdieu's concept of the "habitus" which is supposed to mediate the "necessary correspondence" between class and lifestyles proposed in his theory of taste (Bourdieu 1984). During socialization, individuals incorporate certain patterns of behavior and modes of thought that enact and confirm their class origins. The first part of this "homology" argument (Chan and

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[7] See Abel and Cockerham's (1993) discussion of the various confusions regarding English translations of Weber's terms *Lebensführung*, *Lebensstil*, and *Lebenschancen*.

Goldthorpe 2007b) reflects structuralist accounts of the ways in which mind and body are shaped by one's social environment: that is, of how actors "incorporate" their material and immaterial living conditions and reproduce them through practices. In this light, "lifestyles are routinised practices, the routines incorporated into habits of dress, eating, modes of acting, and favourod milieux of encountering others" (Giddens 1991:81). The second part of the argument concerns the practices that make up lifestyles and provide the cultural identities of social milieus (Bourdieu 1990:86). They are supposed to follow an inherent logic—the "logic of practice"—consisting of a limited number of generative principles that are applied to a multitude of social situations. The habitus "generates meaningful practices" (Bourdieu 1984:170) and is the embodied "logic" of these practices that manifest in different lifestyles and mirror social class and status.

Hence, on the one hand, the habitus is an outcome of recurring patterns of social experience that are characteristic of one's social (class) position and manifest as dispositions of tastes, preferences, and perceptions (Bourdieu 1990:56). On the other hand, the habitus produces specific patterns of social behavior common to actors of similar social standing. This "generative" aspect of the habitus is an essential part of Bourdieu's understanding of the practices that characterize different lifestyles (Bourdieu 1990:53). This "dual nature" of the habitus refers to its functioning as a *mediator* between class and lifestyle practices (Kögler 2013).

Bourdieu assumed that a specific habitus is what brings about a corresponding lifestyle and that lifestyles can be categorized according to their characteristic practices (e.g., Bourdieu 1984:169ff). However, empirically validated typologies of lifestyles are comparatively rare. For some European societies, a number of typologies do exist (e.g., Savage et al. 2013; Schulze 1992; Vester 2005; see Otte 2005 for an overview). Their goal is to assign individuals to a specific "lifestyle category" or "social milieu" based on in-depth interviews and/or a comprehensive range of individual-level indicators that reflect theoretical aspects of the lifestyle concept: for instance, values, consumption, resources, or aesthetic preferences. Importantly, these typologies not only capture the "cultural" dimension of the concept but also its dependence on economic resources.

For example, Vester (2005) developed a typology of social milieus and lifestyles from a combination of in-depth interviews and survey measures. It comprises 11 social milieus that are strongly rooted in more traditional class cultures, primarily determined by job status. The "Traditional Working-Class Milieu," for instance, is characterized by the tradition of skilled labor, the experience of physical work and scarcity, and a strong sense of distance toward those in power, while at the same time valuing close relationships with friends, neighbors, and colleagues (Vester 2005:84). In terms of Bourdieu's concept of the social space, this milieu is endowed with low levels of economic and cultural capital. A contrasting example is the "Liberal-Intellectual Milieu," with high levels of economic and cultural capital. This milieu is characterized by practices of cultural distinction, high intellectual standards, and self-identifies as an "enlightened vanguard, responsible for the universalistic values of justice, peace, and democracy" (Vester 2005:81).

In this and related analyses, the habitus is, if ever, investigated *as* and *through* practice, often using hermeneutic methods of social inquiry. Researchers typically

aim at reconstructing latent and inarticulate structures of sense making that are part of the habitus by looking at types of lifestyles and their constitutive practices (e.g., Lange-Vester and Teiwes-Kügler, 2013; Vester 2005). In this sense, this line of research emphasizes the importance of—not necessarily consciously accessible—patterns of meaning making for bringing about distinct lifestyle practices.

HABITUS AS A PATTERN OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE MEANING MAKING

Given his interest in the links between social structure and cultural practices, Bourdieu was probably less interested in the mechanisms of meaning making underlying the habitus and the formation of lifestyles than in showing that social classes can be understood as forms of practice. Recent theorizing in the tradition of cognitive sociology and the cognitive sciences that is part of the "third phase" of Bourdieu's reception (Lizardo 2012) offers a reinterpretation of Bourdieu's habitus concept that places less emphasis on the side of practice and overt behavior. Instead, this view portrays the habitus primarily as an embodied and psychological array of patterns of perception, classification, valuation, and meaning making (Pickel 2005). In this account, the concept of habitus amounts to an amalgamation of the pre-reflexive bodily and cognitive schemas that guide perception and action. Lizardo (2004), for example, argues that the habitus can be closely linked to the psychological structuralism proposed by Piaget (1970) in which cognitive structures and the assimilation and accommodation of knowledge from the social environment play a crucial role. He suggests that the two kinds of cognitive structures proposed by Piaget, *action schemes* and *logical schemas*, can be approximated to the habitus as a "structured" and "structuring" (i.e., generative) structure (Lizardo 2004:386f). Pickel (2005) has extended this view by suggesting that the habitus is not only a "cognitive" but rather a "biopsychosocial" conception that spans various systems. He argues that operational principles of the habitus can be found on various layers of the individual, from brains (e.g., neurophysiological processes, patterns of feeling and thinking) to minds (e.g., cultural scripts, individual strategies) as well as in social and symbolic systems (e.g., social institutions and representations) (Pickel 2005:442). The habitus can certainly be viewed as a form of "embodied knowledge" (Ignatow 2007) that is compatible with a range of social psychological theories on the social and cultural shaping of basic human cognitive and perceptual abilities (e.g., Grossmann and Varnum 2010).

This view also implies a conjecture that is evident in many other strands of sociological theorizing, namely that one's position in the social structure (as indicated by, e.g., class and status) subtly but systematically shapes actors' thinking, feeling, and self-understanding (Cerulo 2010). It also features prominently in studies linking social structure with personality (Kohn 1989) and emotion (Clay-Warner and Robinson 2008; von Scheve 2013), in certain variants of identity theory (Burke 2004; Smith-Lovin 2007; Stets and Burke 2003; Stryker 2008), as well as in cognitive sociology (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Cerulo 2002; Danna 2014; DiMaggio 1997; Lizardo 2015; Shepherd 2014). Although these approaches differ in their ways to conceptualize social positions (e.g., class, social structure, roles) and the individual-

level ramifications of these positions (e.g., cognitive schemas, emotions, identities), they clearly concur in their structuralist argument that social hierarchy somehow manifests in individual minds and bodies and shapes individuals' identities and worldviews.

Taken together, these more recent perspectives suggest that Bourdieu's original understanding of the habitus can be stated somewhat differently using the conceptual toolkit and terminology of contemporary social psychology, identity theory, and emotion research. One benefit of such a reformulation clearly is theoretical advancement of concepts that are integral to Bourdieu's works. In particular, these novel understandings address existing critical views of the habitus as a "black box" (Boudon 1998) that obfuscates the development of precise models of the links between stratification, bodily and mental dispositions, and lifestyles. As second and related benefit is that these reinterpretations open up avenues for an operationalization and measurement of the habitus that have not yet been employed in current research on lifestyles and that allow for the testing of the plausibility and validity of some of Bourdieu's claims.

HABITUS AS A SELF-RELATED STRUCTURE OF MEANING MAKING

We suggest that the concept of habitus as a psychological and embodied structure of meaning making—as proposed by different cognitive sociologists—can in part be operationalized using the semantic differential technique (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957), a procedure that is well established in sociological identity theory to measure the meanings of concepts. Although this link might appear quite remote at first sight, we argue that identity theory, in particular versions relying on structural symbolic interactionism, and cognitive theories of the habitus share common grounds that justify the application of a single measurement method in both domains.

Identity theory has contributed substantially to our understanding of the self and identity (Burke 2004; Smith-Lovin 2007; Stryker 1980). Although not immediately related to lifestyle and stratification research, a variant of identity theory precisely addresses the links between social structure, meaning making, and the self (Stryker and Burke 2000). Very generally, identity theory differs notably from the theoretical tradition in which the habitus is embedded in that it capitalizes on how the *self* emerges in the context of complex societal organization. Most identity theories rely on symbolic interactionist premises in explaining the role of intersubjective meaning in human interaction. Meaning in the general symbolic interactionist framework emerges from social interactions, which are embedded in broader societal, institutional, and organizational contexts. The self and self-views of individuals stem from social experiences through processes of confirmation and disconfirmation (MacKinnon and Heise 2010). One assumption of identity theory is that self-views combine into different social identities each individual holds: for example, based on group memberships, social roles, and self-attributions (Owens, Robinson, and Smith-Lovin 2010).

In this theoretical framework, links between identity and social structure are established by conceiving of society as a system of interrelated identities. Contrary

to classical symbolic interactionist accounts, society is not considered to be continuously negotiated and reconstituted in social interactions but is instead seen as a relatively stable and enduring set of rules and institutions. Structural identity theory argues that individuals' positions within these institutions shape their selves and identities that become incorporated into trans-situational self-views (MacKinnon and Heise 2010; Owens et al. 2010).

Identity theories explain behavior mainly by referring to these self-views and their role in the construal of social situations that not only encompass self-meanings but also the relatively stable meanings of various other entities: for instance, other actors, actions, and objects (Robinson 2007). The key motivational mechanism is that actors strive for self-verification and the maintenance of their identities: that is, they attempt to maintain self-views and self-meanings through appropriate behaviors (Serpe and Stryker 1987; Stets and Burke 2000; Stryker and Burke 2000). The motivational principle of identity maintenance reduces the degrees of freedom of possible behaviors and pushes actors toward behaviors that resonate with their self-views.

Although stemming from a different school of thought, identity theory shares a number of assumptions with recent cognitive reinterpretations of the habitus and may thus inform studies on the links between lifestyles and stratification. Identity theory assumes that meaning making is central to behavior and identity. While the habitus encompasses the cognitive, affective, and bodily sites that constitute meaning in mostly nonreflective ways (e.g., in aesthetic preferences and taste), identity theorists argue that all things in the world, including identities, carry specific meanings that are more or less directly accessible. Second, in both accounts, meanings are a consequence of socialization and the embeddedness in specific social contexts. Regarding the habitus, this mainly refers to social class and status as categories of stratification. Identity theory is more concerned with networks, small groups, or institutional settings. Third, both approaches argue that meanings and perceptual schemas are more or less directly implicated in generating socially shared patterns of behavior. Whereas the habitus brings about certain patterns of behavior mostly outside of conscious awareness, identity theory assumes that self-views as well as affective meanings of other concepts can in principle be articulated, although they operate mostly automatically and outside conscious awareness in generating behavior.

Given this conceptual overlap of identity theory and recent theorizing of the habitus, one advantage of identity theories is that they have developed a well-established approach at empirically measuring meaning making. In this approach, identity theories notably deviate from the symbolic interactionist paradigm that has mainly employed qualitative methods to reconstruct meaning making, and employ the semantic differential technique to assess the meanings of concepts in a standardized way. Although there are various techniques to measure meaning making (Mohr 1998; Mohr and Ghaziani 2014), one of the most elaborated methods is Osgood's (Osgood et al. 1957) semantic differential technique that uses a variety of bipolar adjectives and shows that meanings of concepts can be regressed onto three basic dimensions of perception and judgment: evaluation, potency, and activity. In this scheme, evaluation refers to nice and pleasant as opposed to bad and unpleasant

feelings. Potency refers to perceptions of strength, power, and control in contrast to weakness, helplessness, and ineffectiveness. Activity refers to feelings of quietness and relaxation versus liveliness and arousal at opposite ends of the spectrum. These dimensions have been shown to be universal perceptual primitives (Osgood et al. 1975; Scholl 2013).

LIFESTYLES AND THE MEANINGS OF SOCIAL CONCEPTS

To lend empirical credibility to recent cognitive accounts of the habitus and, hence, the view that basic patterns of perception and evaluation are linked to individuals' lifestyle practices, we investigate whether basic patterns of meaning making are in fact associated with specific lifestyles. Although existing measures of meaning making have previously been employed in social structural contexts (Ambrasat et al. 2014; Gordon et al. 1963; Heise 1966; Kroska 2001; Sewell and Heise 2010; Smith-Lovin and Douglass 1992), we know of no studies that have directly tested the theoretical assumption that patterns of meaning making are characteristic of certain lifestyles. If this was indeed the case, it would (1) provide sociology with an empirical way to measure relevant aspects of the habitus and to refute some of the "black box" criticism; (2) lend support to the proposition that patterns of meaning making mediate between social structure and lifestyles; and (3) advance identity theories by showing that they might be used to explain the identities that are associated with certain lifestyles and that self-identities are intimately related to one's position in a stratified society.

To investigate whether lifestyles are in fact associated with distinct patterns of meaning making, we use data from a quasi-representative survey of the German population that was part of a larger study as well as additional novel data of a second survey, both containing information on lifestyles, sociodemographics, and meanings of a broad range of social concepts (Ambrasat et al. 2014; Schauenburg et al. 2015). Importantly, we included a novel measure of the meaning of one's self or self-view in the survey that is critical to establish the meanings of concepts *relative* to a person's self-meanings.

METHODS

Participants

Our analysis is based on data stemming from two related web-based surveys that contain data on lifestyles, sociodemographics, and measures of the meanings of various social concepts (see Measures section for details). A first survey that was part of a larger study was administered to 2,849 participants living in Germany (1,532 female, 1,499 male, average age 45 years). Participants had been recruited from a large commercial opt-in access panel with approximately 100,000 registered individuals. To obtain a sample that represents the stratification of German society and to minimize bias from the access panel population, we generated a proportional sample with age, sex, household income, education, and residential location as quotas (for details, see Ambrasat et al. 2014). Although we used a quota sampling

approach, preliminary analyses indicated too few cases in some of the lifestyle categories of interest to us. To increase the number of cases, we recruited an additional 589 participants from the same access panel using an initial lifestyle quota filter. Our total sample for the present study thus consists of 3,438 individuals (1,747 females [50.81%], 1,691 males [49.19%] with an average age of 45.8 [SD = 14.8], ranging from 18 to 88 years).

Measures

Meaning Making To measure basic patterns of meaning making, we asked respondents to rate a total of 909 words denoting social concepts related to the semantic fields of Authority and Community as foundational dimensions of sociality. We opted for these very general social concepts to avoid any lifestyle bias in the selection of our stimulus material. Words from both semantic fields were selected using established corpus linguistic analyses (for details, see Ambrasat et al. 2014). The stimulus set included 306 nouns denoting social identities, 155 verbs denoting social behaviors, 235 abstract nouns, and 213 adjectives. Each respondent was presented with 59 out of the 909 words (out of context) to obtain ratings on the evaluation (bad vs. good), potency (weak vs. strong), and activity (calming vs. exciting) dimensions using 9-point bipolar semantic differential rating scales (Heise 2010; Osgood et al. 1957). Respondents were asked the following question: "What sentiments do you spontaneously feel if you recognize the following word(s)?" This question, which is widely used in affective meaning research (Heise 2010), is supposed to assess the spontaneous and immediate meanings that respondents associate with a concept.

Of the 909 words, 9 words were presented to all respondents. The remaining 900 words were allocated to 18 subsets consisting of 50 words each. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of these 18 subsets. Subsets were balanced for words' syntactic class. All words in each subset were presented in random order. In total, each word received between 189 and 222 ratings scattered across the different lifestyle groups. In addition, we asked all participants to complete a measure of one's self-identity: that is, a proxy item measuring respondents' self-meanings (see above; MacKinnon and Heise 2010; Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve 2014). Participants were asked to respond to the item "Myself, as I really am" on the semantic differential rating scales.

Lifestyles To categorize participants into different lifestyle groups, we draw on a meta-analysis of more than 30 existing lifestyle typologies (Otte 2004) suggesting that most of these typologies exhibit a similar structure based on two latent dimensions. The first dimension, *Living Standard*, captures cultural and economic capital, including the extent of highbrow cultural consumption. The second dimension, *Biographical Perspective*, represents self-assessments of "traditional" versus "modern" worldviews: for instance, concerning religiousness, family values, and leisure time activities. Based on this meta-analysis, Otte (Otte 2005; Otte and Baur 2008) developed a valid, reliable, and economical short scale that locates respondents on these two latent dimensions, spanning an ordinal 3 x 3 (high, middle, low) matrix

Fig. 1. Lifestyle groups according to Otte (2004, 2005) and Otte and Baur (2008), authors' translation of German labels. Y-axis represents the dimension *Living Standard*, i.e., economic and cultural capital. X-axis represents the dimension *Biographical Perspective*, i.e., modern vs. traditional value orientations.

representing nine distinct lifestyle categories[8] (see Fig. 1). Using this scale, we do not aim at estimating lifestyle groups but rather, at approximating subjects' fit to one of the nine categories.

The *Established* lifestyle stands in the tradition of the "propertied bourgeoisie" and is characterized by political conservatism, principles of social distinction that operate on rank and prestige, an exclusive living standard, consumption of classical "highbrow" culture, and a commitment to occupational status and success, leadership, and religious values. *Conventionalists* are seen as the "petite bourgeoisie"; they embrace the values of duty and social acceptance, are oriented toward social and economic security, show a preference for "highbrow" cultural consumption—although with a leaning toward the popular and folksy, and hold traditional and religious values. *Workers* stand in the tradition of the working classes and craftsmanship, with close ties to labor unions and their political ideologies, show patterns of "lowbrow" and folksy cultural consumption, and are members of public clubs and associations. The *Educated* represent the higher educated upper-middle classes with mostly liberal values who seek self-fulfillment in their jobs, show patterns of "highbrow" cultural consumption with a leaning toward the alternative, and have a strong sense for exclusive taste. *Social Climbers* focus strongly on their professional career, embrace family values, and participate in modern leisure culture in various ways. The *Familials* pursue a home- and family-centered way of life, mostly because of their focus on raising children and having limited economic resources, and participate in traditional fairs and modern "lowbrow" mass culture. *Modernists* think of themselves as a sociocultural avant-garde, hold postmaterialistic and cosmopolitan values, cherish reflexivity and creativity, and are open to new experiences. *Hedonists* indulge in fashion, music festivals, club culture, and social movements; think of themselves as cultural innovators; and seek pleasure through consumption. Finally, the *Entertained* show a strong orientation toward materialistic values, actively

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[8] Even though Otte (2005) uses Weber's German term *Lebensführung* (conduct of life) to emphasize both latent value orientations and manifest behaviors, we retain the term *lifestyles* for the sake of coherence.

participate in the happenings of modern mass culture, seek status confirmation outside the family and the job, and are largely depoliticized.

Sociodemographics To be able to investigate the association of lifestyles with established indicators of social stratification, we also measured select sociodemographics, such as age, income, education, household composition, and residential area.

RESULTS

Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We first investigate whether lifestyle categories are associated with social stratification. This should not only support convergent validity of the lifestyle indicator but also test the theoretical predictions regarding this linkage. Second, we establish whether lifestyles differ with regard to respondents' typical self-meanings. Finally, we test the critical hypothesis that the meanings of various social concepts, relative to participants' self-meanings, differ across lifestyles.

Lifestyles and Social Stratification

Given that lifestyles are supposed to be linked to one's objective living conditions, they should be systematically associated with respondents' sociodemographic characteristics. Being key components of socioeconomic status, we take income and education as indicators of economic and cultural capital, respectively, and thus to represent the dimension *Living Standard* of a lifestyle category. Hence, respondents assigned to a lifestyle category with a relatively low living standard (e.g., *Workers*) should be, overall, lower educated and have a lower a household income than those belonging to lifestyle categories with a higher living standard (e.g., *Social Climbers*). Regarding the dimension *Biographical Perspective*, respondents with a more traditional lifestyle should be older and more often live in rural instead of urban areas. Table I shows the distribution of mean age, education, income, and residency across the nine lifestyle categories and confirms our theoretical predictions. This is particularly evident looking at education and income: for instance, comparing *Modernists* to the *Entertained*. Also, for a given level of economic and cultural capital, the more "modern" the *Biographical Perspective*, the younger respondents are and the more likely they are to live in urban settings. This not only indicates that lifestyles are associated with social stratification but also supports the validity of the lifestyle indicator.

Self-Identities Across Lifestyles

The conjecture that lifestyles are associated with distinct patterns of meaning making is not only relevant to the habitus and the practices that are constitutive for lifestyles but also for individuals' self-identities (i.e., self-meanings), which should differ across lifestyles. Although somewhat speculative, we expect that self-identities roughly reflect the living standards associated with a lifestyle and are therefore tied

Table I.   Sociodemographics of the Nine Lifestyle Categories

Established (N = 53)	**Educated (N = 260)**	**Modernists (N = 383)**
Mean age = 58 (SD = 11)	Mean age = 51 (15)	Mean age = 44 (13)
Education	Education	Education
high[1]: 37%	high: 36%	high: 47%
middle[2]: 43%	middle: 43%	middle: 47%
basic[3]: 20%	basic: 21%	basic: 6%
Income[4]: 3,107 €	Income: 3,046 €	Income: 3,364 €
Urban residency[5]: 24%	Urban residency: 42%	Urban residency: 45%
Conventionalists (N = 397)	**Social climbers (N = 896)**	**Hedonists (N = 353)**
Mean age = 52 (13)	Mean age = 47 (15)	Mean age = 38 (14)
Education	Education	Education
high: 24%	high: 27%	high: 25%
middle: 49%	middle: 44%	middle: 50%
basic: 27%	basic: 29%	basic: 25%
Income: 2,327 €	Income: 2,369 €	Income: 2,460 €
Urban residency: 24%	Urban residency: 30%	Urban residency: 34%
Workers (N = 174)	**Familials (N = 648)**	**Entertained (N = 374)**
Mean age = 54 (14)	Mean age = 45 (14)	Mean age = 36 (13)
Education	Education	Education
high: 7%	high: 8%	high: 12%
middle: 40%	middle: 39%	middle: 48%
basic: 53%	middle: 53%	basic: 40%
Income: 1,591 €	Income: 1,867 €	Income: 2,014 €
Urban residency: 23%	Urban residency: 23%	Urban residency: 29%

Note: [1]German degree of schooling: Abitur or other higher education entrance qualification; [2]German degree of schooling: Mittlere Reife/Realschule; [3]German degree of schooling: Hauptschule/Volksschule; [4]Income measured as net household income; [5]Residence was asked in four categories: big city, small city or town, small town, rural area.

to social stratification. For example, lifestyles with high levels of economic and cultural capital should be associated with more positive and potent self-identities, whereas those with lower levels should yield less positive and less potent identity meanings. The descriptive results in Table II broadly confirm this view, indicating systematic variation in self-meanings across lifestyles. For example, *Modernists* tend to have more positive, more potent, and more active self-identities. Likewise, better-endowed lifestyles have more potent self-identities compared to less-well-endowed lifestyles. Conversely, *Workers* and *Familials* exhibit less potent and less active self-identities, which might reflect a feeling of being underprivileged. Looking at the *Biographical Perspective* dimension, results generally indicate that more "modern" lifestyles are associated with more positive, active, and potent self-meanings.

To further probe these findings, we computed linear regression models using lifestyles as independent variables, self-identities (separately for each Evaluation, Potency, Activity [EPA] dimension) as the dependent variables, and participants' age and gender as controls (Table III). *Social Climbers*, located at the center of the 3 x 3 lifestyle matrix, serve as reference category. Results support our descriptive analyses, indicating significant differences in self-identities between lifestyle groups. The one exception is the *Established* lifestyle, most likely due to the low number of cases.

Table II. Self-Meanings of Different Lifestyle Categories

Established	Educated	Modernists
E_{self} = 1.57 (0.21)	E_{self} = 1.87 (0.09)	E_{self} = 2.32 (0.07)
P_{self} = 0.70 (0.22)	P_{self} = 1.17 (0.09)	P_{self} = 1.49 (0.08)
A_{self} = 0.85 (0.22)	A_{self} = 1.14 (0.10)	A_{self} = 1.58 (0.09)
Conventionalists	**Social climbers**	**Hedonists**
E_{self} = 1.71 (0.07)	E_{self} = 1.66 (0.05)	E_{self} = 2.03 (0.08)
P_{self} = 0.60 (0.08)	P_{self} = 0.82 (0.05)	P_{self} = 1.13 (0.09)
A_{self} = 0.65 (0.09)	A_{self} = 0.82 (0.06)	A_{self} = 1.42 (0.09)
Workers	**Familials**	**Entertained**
E_{self} = 1.40 (0.13)	E_{self} = 1.50 (0.07)	E_{self} = 1.95 (0.08)
P_{self} = 0.30 (0.13)	P_{self} = 0.50 (0.07)	P_{self} = 1.21 (0.09)
A_{self} = 0.56 (0.14)	A_{self} = 0.55 (0.07)	A_{self} = 1.31 (0.09)

Note: Means for each lifestyle group and corresponding standard errors of mean (SEM) in brackets; for comparison: average total sample (N = 2,849) self-meanings are E_{self} = 1.74 (0.03), P_{self} = 0.86 (0.03), A_{self} = 0.93 (0.03).

We interpret these differences in self-identities as reflecting the distinct social and cultural identities of lifestyle groups and their social stratification. Individuals within the higher endowed lifestyles have more potent identities whereas the more modern lifestyles are linked to more active identities, both showing more positive self-evaluations compared to the reference group. This shows that social stratification is not only mirrored in lifestyle-specific practices—as known from previous studies—but also in respondents' self-meanings and identities. Based on these lifestyle-specific self-views, we also expect varying "worldviews," that is, lifestyle-specific perceptions and evaluations of various social concepts, as proposed by many accounts of the habitus.

Self-Related Patterns of Meaning-Making Across Lifestyles

To investigate whether more general patterns of meaning making differ across lifestyle groups, we analyzed differences in the meanings of social concepts across lifestyles relative to respondents' self-identities. The rationale for not simply comparing the meanings of concepts across lifestyles is straightforward. It is one thing, for example, to evaluate the concept of "nurse" as quite pleasant (1.39), somewhat powerful (0.72), and a little arousing (0.77) when the meaning of one's self-identity is even weaker and less arousing (E = 1.71, P = 0.6, A = 0.65), as it is the case for *Conventionalists*. The opposite is true when the meaning of one's self-identity is notably more pleasant (E = 2.32), more potent (P = 1.49), and more arousing (A = 1.58), as it is the case for *Modernists*, for whom the concept of "nurse" clearly deviates from their self-identities.

When comparing meanings across lifestyles, we therefore account for the self-relatedness of any meaning by technically centralizing the meanings of all concepts around the self-identity ratings as assessed by the self-item "Myself, as I really am."

Table III. Associations Between Lifestyles and Self-Meanings, Linear Regression Models

Lifestyles	Evaluation		Potency		Activity	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Social climbers	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Established	−0.09	−0.05	−0.13	−0.10	0.03	0.02
	(0.67)	(0.83)	(0.56)	(0.65)	(0.90)	(0.94)
Conventionalists	0.05	0.06	−0.22*	−0.22*	−0.17	−0.19[+]
	(0.59)	(0.53)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Workers	−0.26*	−0.23[+]	−0.53**	−0.53**	−0.26[+]	−0.28[+]
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Educated	0.21[+]	0.22*	0.35**	0.37**	0.32*	0.30*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Familials	−0.15[+]	−0.16*	−0.32**	−0.32**	−0.26**	−0.25**
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Modernists	0.67**	0.65**	0.67**	0.67**	0.76**	0.77**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Hedonists	0.37**	0.34**	0.30**	0.29*	0.60**	0.62**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Entertained	0.30**	0.26*	0.38**	0.36**	0.49**	0.52**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Covariates						
female		0.13*		−0.09[+]		0.27**
		(0.01)		(0.08)		(0.00)
age		−0.00*		−0.00		0.00
		(0.02)		(0.38)		(0.68)
obs	3,438	3,420	3,438	3,420	3,438	3,420
F-statistics	12.89	11.65	20.62	16.99	19.46	17.59

Note: P-values in brackets; statistics: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Centralization : *computing self* − *centered meanings*

$$E_{sc}(word) = E(word) − E(self)$$
$$P_{sc}(word) = P(word) − P(self)$$
$$A_{sc}(word) = A(word) − A(self)$$

This way, each respondent's self-view becomes the center of a transformed EPA space and all other concepts are arranged around this center. Hence, self-centralization is subject specific—that is, for respondents with very positive and potent self-identities; other concepts are relatively more negative and weaker compared to respondents with more negative and less potent self-identities.

To further investigate potential differences in meanings across lifestyles, we compare mean ratings of each lifestyle group for each concept with the mean ratings of all other lifestyles. In the following, we report the absolute numbers of concepts that significantly deviate in Evaluation, Potency, or Activity from the mean of all other lifestyles (many concepts differ on more than one dimension) and give examples from the 20 most outstanding deviations reported in Table AI in the appendix. Due to the limited number of cases, we omit analysis of the *Established* lifestyle and need to interpret results of *Workers* and *Educated* with caution.

Conventionalists Conventionalists differ significantly from all other lifestyles in their perceptions of 98 concepts altogether. Looking at the 20 most outstanding deviations, *Conventionalists* evaluate, among others, religious concepts as more positive, more potent, and partially more arousing than all other lifestyles. *Prayer*, *church*, *Bible*, and *faithful* are concepts that produce sentiments close to *Conventionalists'* self-identities. Furthermore, *Conventionalists* also appreciate values like *security* and *learning*. On the other hand, they are more sensitive toward social threats. Concepts like *to occupy* and *revolution* are perceived more negatively, more potent, and more arousing compared to other lifestyles.

Workers Workers differ significantly in their perceptions of 103 concepts in total. Most noticeable is the relative esteem of concepts usually signaling inferiority; for example, concepts like *incapable*, *impecunious*, *immature*, and *weakness* are perceived as more positive by *Workers* than by any other lifestyle. The same is true, however, for concepts like *family member*, *grandmother*, *ideology*, *compatriot*, and *citizens' campaign*. This "groundedness" of *Workers* is also reflected in positive evaluations of values like *good-natured* and *decent*, compared to other lifestyles.

The Educated The *Educated* lifestyle does not deviate notably from the average of all other lifestyle groups in its patterns of meaning making. We find only 20 concepts in total that significantly deviate from the average (which might be due to the low number of cases in this lifestyle group). Most notable deviations are related to submissive behaviors and inferiority. The *Educated* perceive words like *bankrupt*, *to conform*, *timid*, and *to sacrifice oneself* as more negative, much weaker, and less arousing compared to other lifestyles. On the other hand, concepts like *influential* and *elegant* are perceived as more positive and potent, probably mirroring the high status of this lifestyle.

Social Climbers Social climbers in a way represent the middle classes in various respects; hence, we did not expect pronounced deviations in the meanings of concepts compared to the lifestyle average. However, *Social Climbers* significantly deviate in their evaluations of 56 concepts altogether. *Scientist*, *priest*, *Christian*, *female*, *well-off*, *autonomous*, and *tutoring* are perceived as more positive by *Social Climbers* compared to other lifestyles. This might reflect a certain "progressive" orientation and social aspirations of the *Social Climbers,* while still being rooted in traditional values and principles.

Familials Because *Familials* are characterized by relatively modest self-identities (see Table II), several concepts appear more positively, more potent, and more arousing compared to other lifestyles. Hence, a total of 108 concepts are perceived significantly different by *Familials*. In particular, submissive concepts like *adjusted*, *obeying*, *to subordinate*, *defensive*, and *to conform* are perceived as more potent and positive compared to the lifestyle average. This might indicate identification processes in which submissive behaviors are more salient and accepted as a source of self-identity.

Modernists Modernists show the most positive and potent self-identities and their patterns of meaning making deviate notably from other lifestyles. Results show 252

concepts altogether that are perceived significantly different by *Modernists*. For example, religious concepts like *pope*, *believe*, and *Bible* are perceived as more negative and less exciting compared to other lifestyles, which stands in stark contrast to *Conventionalists*. Not only religious but also submissive concepts such as *to obey*, *to conform*, and *to fear* are perceived as more negative, weaker, and partly less arousing compared to other milieus.

Hedonists Hedonists exhibit outstandingly arousing self-identities compared to other lifestyles. Accordingly, patterns of meaning making deviate most notably on the Activity dimension. In total, results show 105 concepts that deviate significantly from the average. In particular, *the retired*, *grandmother*, *brother*, and *siblings* are perceived as less exciting compared to all other lifestyles. Also, concepts like *priest* and *religious* are perceived as more negative.

The Entertained Results show 159 in total concepts that are perceived significantly different by the *Entertained* compared to other lifestyles. Notable examples include religious concepts such as *Christian*, *to pray*, and *Bible* that are perceived as more negative and partly also less potent and active. Also, the *Entertained* deviate from the educational aspirations of the meritocratic middle classes in perceiving concepts like *theater*, *creative*, *high school graduation*, *student*, and *choir* as less arousing and somewhat weaker compared to all other lifestyles.

Taken together, these lifestyle-specific analyses show that lifestyle groups exhibit distinct patterns of meaning making that are intimately related to respondents' self-identities, generally supporting the view that lifestyles are brought about by an underlying habitus, conceived of as socially shared pattern of meaning making. Regarding the dimension *Biographical Perspective*, our analyses show that patterns of meaning making in more traditional lifestyles (in particular *Conventionalists*) are characterized by a pronounced esteem of the religious and the sacred, whereas more modern lifestyles have clearly more negative views of these concepts. Looking at the dimension *Living Standard*, we find that less-well-endowed lifestyle groups (especially *Familials*) attach very different meanings to many submissive and subordinating concepts than the well-endowed lifestyles (*Modernists* and the *Educated*).

DISCUSSION

This study addressed the question of how people's objective living conditions and their positions in a social hierarchy affect their ways of life. More specifically, we were interested in the question of whether socially stratified patterns of meaning making are associated with specific lifestyles. Previous research has frequently referred to Bourdieu's (1984) explanatory framework to investigate this question. Although the habitus is a central concept within this framework and addresses possible mechanisms that produce these linkages, existing research has either treated the habitus as a black box, capitalized on its connection with practice and lifestyles by investigating patterns of cultural consumption, or reconstructed patterns of sense making that are characteristic for a specific habitus from interviews. However, no studies have yet investigated associations between the acquired "corporeal and

mental dispositions" (Wacquant 2011:82) that are part of the habitus and people's lifestyles and objective living conditions.

To examine these associations, we accounted for recent cognitive reinterpretations of the habitus as a basic psychological and bodily structure of—not necessarily consciously accessible—meaning making. This understanding opens up avenues for measuring the habitus at an individual level, and we have shown that sociological identity theory provides adequate theoretical and methodological tools to measure meaning making along the dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity. In line with previous theorizing and research, we assumed that distinct lifestyle practices are generated by a specific habitus. Hence, given that the habitus can be thought of as encompassing patterns of meaning making, these patterns should systematically differ across lifestyle categories. To test these assumptions, we conducted a quasi-representative survey of the German population, measuring the meaning of self-identities and various social concepts.

Initial analyses show, first, that lifestyles are socially stratified and associated with sociodemographic indicators such as age, education, income, and area of residency, as predicted by our theoretical considerations and previous studies.

Our results show, second, that the meanings of respondents' self-identities vary systematically with their lifestyles and thus also with their position in the social structure. Individuals with lifestyles exhibiting a high and well-endowed living standard tend to have more positive and more potent self-views compared to those with lifestyles of lower living standard. Likewise, respondents with lifestyles that include more modern worldviews have significantly more active self-identities compared to lifestyles with traditional views. These findings lend support to identity theory in showing that self-identities are systematically associated with one's position in the social structure. Moreover, they support our main line of argument regarding the links between stratification, meaning making, and lifestyle practices.

Third, our results indicate that the meanings of various social concepts do indeed differ systematically across the lifestyles we measured. For each lifestyle, we find a number of social concepts whose meanings differ significantly from the average meaning across all lifestyles. For example, *Familials* perceive submissive concepts like adjusted, obeying, to subordinate, defensive, or to conform as more potent and more positive than the lifestyle average. *Modernists*, for instance, perceive religious concepts like pope, believe, and Bible, as more negative and less exciting compared to other lifestyles. These examples show that we not only find significant differences across lifestyles in the meanings of the 909 concepts we investigated but also that these differences are meaningful regarding the lifestyle descriptors we used. This supports the presumed link between patterns of meaning making and practices, as proposed by Bourdieu's concept of the habitus.

Taken together, our analyses show that individuals exhibiting a common lifestyle share self-meanings as well as patterns of meaning making regarding a broad variety of social concepts. Moreover, the concepts differing most significantly across lifestyles are meaningful in that they are representative of the semantics of the lifestyle categories used in our analysis. Given that these patterns of meaning making can be understood as a dimension of one's habitus, our results add to an understanding of the linkages between social stratification and lifestyles, in particular

regarding the underlying and mediating mechanisms. Within the framework of cognitive sociology, our study supports the view that one's location in a stratified society, as expressed by objective living conditions and access to material and symbolic resources, significantly affects how people perceive and evaluate the social world on a basic and largely pre-reflexive level. Although our study does not speak to any causal relationships, theory suggests that these basic patterns of meaning making are *generative* in a sense that they bring about "class-specific" lifestyles. As previous studies have demonstrated (not perfectly linear) associations between stratification and lifestyles mainly by looking at cultural consumption, our study adds to this literature by providing insights into the underlying microlevel mechanisms of perception and evaluation.

Moreover, our results show that certain dimensions of the habitus may be understood and assessed as patterns of meaning making that can be measured using the semantic differential technique. This constitutes an important methodological contribution because our measure of the habitus is conceptually independent from both, measures of class and status and measures of overt lifestyle behavior. The study therefore adds to the sociology of culture, cognition and stratification an approach for population-wide assessments of some of the individual-level "building blocks" of culture.

The generalization of results is qualified by the limitations of our study. First and most importantly, the study is correlational in nature and does not provide insights into any causal processes. Here, future studies might employ household panel designs to be better able to track the influence of objective living conditions on the development of meaning-making patterns. Second, the study rests on the meanings of 909 social concepts. Although this is already an exceptionally broad array of concepts, one might argue that other concepts are still more (or less) responsive in view of lifestyle differences, and hence, the selection of concepts might bias our results. Third, the study has been conducted using German participants and a lifestyle indicator that has only been established in German society. Although specific lifestyle categories will certainly differ in other societies, the basic associations between lifestyles and patterns of meaning making are likely to be robust. However, moderating factors are the degree and the principles according to which a given society is stratified. For example, societies in which racial differences are crucial to stratification, we would expect that both lifestyle practices and corresponding patterns of meaning making are significantly determined by racial differences as well. Hence, we consider our study an initial contribution to more precisely investigating the mechanisms underlying the linkages between stratification and lifestyles and, more generally, between social structure and culture, and future research needs to address the limitations stated above.

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APPENDIX

Table AI. Twenty Most Deviating Concepts for Each Lifestyle, Self-Centered EPA Profiles

	Evaluation		Potency		Activity	
Conventionalists	E_{Conv}	E_{rest}	P_{Conv}	P_{rest}	A_{Conv}	A_{rest}
prayer	0.64**	−1.89	1.05**	−0.85	0.41**	−2.07
church	−0.05**	−2.5	0.68**	−1.13	−0.82*	−2.47
opposition	−1.28	−1.86	0.33	−0.68	1.61**	−0.59
Bible	0.09**	−2.21	0.41**	−1.38	−0.95*	−2.24
to occupy	−4.21**	−2.97	1.97**	0.08	1.72*	0.27
revolution	−3.66**	−1.78	2.03*	1.17	2.59*	1.28
security	1.5**	0.17	1.3	0.55	0.05*	−1.08
to learn	0.74**	−0.74	1.17*	0.04	−0.26	−0.54
faithful	0.33**	−1.55	0.8*	−0.72	−1	−1.74
noble	0.39	−0.11	1.44**	0.06	0.22	−0.57
rebel	−2.67	−2.3	1.22*	−0.04	2.56**	0.67
enemy of the state	−4.44	−3.63	0.94*	−0.43	2.22**	0.19
duty	−0.09**	−1.78	0.95	0.27	−0.09	−0.85
theater	0.95**	−0.84	0.68**	−0.7	0.36	−0.72
armed	−5.21*	−4.01	2.03*	0.9	3.17**	1.19
arabic	−1.39	−2.26	0.22*	−1.03	1.28**	−0.76
rioter	−4.78	−4.34	0.44*	−1.17	2.94**	0.88
to go on strike	−2.38	−2.19	1.42**	−0.27	0.92	0.37
to solidarize	0.77**	−0.6	1.55**	−0.08	0.55*	−0.66
shame	−5.41**	−3.94	−0.69	−1.26	0.41	−0.63

Table AI.   (Continued)

Workers	Evaluation		Potency		Activity	
	E_{Conv}	E_{rest}	P_{Conv}	P_{rest}	A_{Conv}	A_{rest}
Workers	E_{Work}	E_{rest}	P_{Work}	P_{rest}	A_{Work}	A_{rest}
family member	2.78**	0.28	2.89**	0.04	1	−0.09
incapable	−1.8	−3.82	0.8**	−2.59	0.6	−1.93
impecunious	−2.2	−4.23	1**	−2.65	0.6	−1.74
hinder	−1.4	−3.35	1.8**	−1.68	0.2	−1.4
ideology	0.89**	−1.76	0.89	−0.13	1.22*	−0.52
spiritual	−0.43	−1.72	1.57**	−0.72	−1.14	−0.95
compatriot	1**	−1.27	−0.14	−0.78	−0.57	−0.74
folk initiative	2.13**	−1.06	0.88	−0.09	0.75	0.01
baby	3**	0.69	−0.86	−1.98	1.57	1.24
beating	−4	−4.83	2.71**	−0.8	0.86	0.79
to let	1.25**	−1.72	−0.38	−0.71	0.13	−1.02
loneliness	−2.6	−2.97	1.6**	−1.84	0.2*	−2.39
immature	0.25**	−3.13	−0.25*	−2.32	−0.5	−0.84
magistracy	−0.78**	−3.04	1.89*	0.05	0.44	−1.16
weakness	0.88**	−2.94	−0.75*	−2.57	−1.88	−2.18
good-natured	2.25**	0.04	1.25**	−0.81	0.63**	−1.58
dance	−0.6	−0.11	2**	−0.43	1.8	0.45
decent	1.33	0.24	2**	−0.06	1.11**	−0.97
believe	1.88**	−1.29	1.5*	−0.42	0.5*	−1.44
grandmother	1.63	0.64	2.13**	−0.1	1.13**	−1.12
Educated	E_{Edu}	E_{rest}	P_{Edu}	P_{rest}	A_{Edu}	A_{rest}
villain	−5.08	−3.97	−3.67**	−0.75	−0.67	−0.05
bankrupt	−5.33	−4.76	−4.5**	−1.51	−2.17	−0.47
influential	0.82**	−1.11	2.45*	1.23	0.45	0.29
revolution	−0.91	−2.16	2.55*	1.23	3.55**	1.36
migrant	−1.18	−2.17	−0.91	−1.35	1.36**	−0.79
profit	−1	−1.38	2*	0.62	2.09**	0.15
to conform	−2.68	−1.62	−2.74**	−0.86	−2.42*	−1.19
timid	−4.08*	−2.41	−4.25**	−2.26	−3.5	−2.34
psychoanalyst	−2.29	−1.96	−1.29	−0.22	−3.36**	−1.32
security	−1.07**	0.43	0.6	0.63	−1	−0.96
elegant	1.18**	−0.17	0.73	−0.03	0.09	−0.59
punishment	−4.2	−4.08	−0.53	−0.11	−1.73**	0.22
to sacrifice oneself	−3.62	−2.71	−2.92**	−0.48	−0.23	−0.29
to honor	−0.33	−0.32	−0.33	0.16	−1.53**	−0.05
general	−2.62	−2.86	−1.15**	0.98	−0.69	0.27
humbled	−4.9	−4.6	−1.25	−2.04	0.55**	−1.28
capable	0.15	−0.07	−0.62**	0.89	−0.38	0.02
gun club	−3.28	−2.53	−1.83	−1.07	−2.78**	−0.96
boss (male)	−2	−1.94	0.28**	0.68	−0.42	−0.24
government	−2.7	−2.78	−0.84**	−0.35	−1.69	−1.46
Social Climbers	E_{Climb}	E_{rest}	P_{Climb}	P_{rest}	A_{Climb}	A_{rest}
scientist	0.09**	−1.23	0.17	−0.14	−0.8	−0.95
priest	−0.86**	−2.34	−0.51	−1.58	−1.4	−2.21
folk initiative	−0.73	−0.99	0.69**	−0.33	1.23**	−0.42
Christian	−0.37**	−1.83	−0.23*	−1.22	−0.51*	−1.71
to obey	−1.69	−2.01	0.29**	−0.95	−0.78	−1.26

Table AI. (Continued)

Social Climbers	Evaluation		Potency		Activity	
	E_{Conv}	E_{rest}	P_{Conv}	P_{rest}	A_{Conv}	A_{rest}
female	0.94**	−0.07	0.09	−0.15	0.86	0.12
well-off	−0.23**	−1.56	0.54*	−0.45	−0.54	−1.11
autonomous	−0.74**	−2.01	0.26	−0.51	−0.31	−0.81
tutoring	−1.14**	−2.34	−0.6	−1.18	−0.69	−1.29
sick_person	−2.2**	−3.51	−2.43	−2.69	−1.74	−2.4
help	0.47	−0.07	1.22**	−0.04	0.33	−0.2
nationalist	−3.23	−3.06	0.02**	−1.57	−0.79	−0.64
self-loving	−4	−3.4	−1	−1.63	0.6**	−0.89
accusation	−3.52	−3.59	0.58**	−0.93	0.23	−0.15
individual	−0.45	−0.87	−0.26	−0.15	0.45**	−0.85
foreigner (female)	−1.09**	−2.23	−1.09	−1.47	−0.57	−0.86
educator	−1.35	−1.74	0.35	0.17	0.79**	−0.42
elegant	−0.28	−0.04	−0.75**	0.21	−0.67	−0.51
questioning	−4.02	−3.89	0.44	0.09	1.17**	−0.21
obsequy	−3**	−4.31	−0.83	−1.58	−2.26	−2.55
Familials	E_{Fam}	E_{rest}	P_{Fam}	P_{rest}	A_{Fam}	A_{rest}
adjusted	−1.27*	−2.22	−0.14**	−1.73	−0.7**	−2.27
obeying	−0.33**	−1.92	−0.44*	−1.6	−1*	−2.03
trader	−1.75	−1.99	0.45**	−1.03	0.25*	−0.67
defensive	−1.29**	−2.44	−0.71*	−1.67	−0.45**	−2.09
civil	−0.52**	−1.69	0.32**	−1.13	−0.77*	−1.73
primitive	−2.29**	−3.81	−1.68	−2.39	−1.45	−1.39
fan	−1.18	−1.51	1.12**	−0.42	1.91*	0.72
monarchy	−1.07**	−2.7	0.26**	−1.22	−1.11	−1.81
ex-husband	−2.72	−3.4	−0.38**	−2.05	−0.4	−0.92
square	−3**	−3.97	−1.02*	−1.91	−0.57**	−2.2
SPD (party)	−1.94	−2.8	−0.29**	−1.73	−0.1**	−1.89
to subordinate	−2.5*	−3.45	−0.74**	−2.26	−1.07*	−2.14
diner	1.17**	−0.15	0.22*	−0.63	−0.59	−1.17
disreputable	−2.6	−2.85	0.32**	−1.14	0.73	−0.1
vain	−2.63	−2.91	−0.1**	−1.41	−0.05**	−1.08
choir	−1.5	−1.65	0.08**	−1.33	−0.45	−1.2
to conform	−0.87**	−2	−0.07**	−1.37	−0.72*	−1.5
diligent	1.13**	−0.14	0.93	0.36	0.83*	0.09
agency	−2.26*	−3.15	0.94*	−0.17	−0.16**	−1.99
mistress	−2.63	−3.31	1.42**	−0.27	0.75*	−0.27
Modernists	E_{Mod}	E_{rest}	P_{Mod}	P_{rest}	A_{Mod}	A_{rest}
subdued	−5.2**	−2.58	−3.8**	−2.3	−4.47**	−2.11
legal guardian	−4.93**	−2.4	0.07	0.31	−3.2**	−0.68
to obey	−3.93**	−1.77	−1.27	−0.61	−3.6**	−0.94
pope	−4.93**	−2.15	−1.2	−0.59	−4.47**	−2.03
to conform	−2.4*	−1.31	−1.4	−0.61	−3.13**	−0.74
manipulate	−6.13**	−3.8	−0.93	−0.12	−1.53*	−0.08
to summon	−5.27**	−3.07	−0.93	−0.18	−2.33**	−0.16
despot	−5.48**	−3.17	−0.4	−0.33	−1.2*	−0.02
gangster	−6.27**	−4.23	−1.27	0.04	−0.8	0.68
to steal	−6.4**	−4.47	−2.13	−1.63	−0.47	−0.02
minority	−3.53*	−2.24	−3.2*	−1.85	−3.73**	−1.11
believe	−2.23*	−1.01	−1.5*	−0.19	−3.18**	−1.12
humbled	−6.6**	−4.47	−4.6**	−1.74	−3.07**	−0.93
greed	−6.2**	−4.17	−2.13*	−0.24	−1.6*	0.12

Table AI. (Continued)

Modernists	Evaluation		Potency		Activity	
	E_{Conv}	E_{rest}	P_{Conv}	P_{rest}	A_{Conv}	A_{rest}
Bible	−3	−1.82	−3.7**	−0.88	−3.65**	−1.91
to envy	−4.53**	−2.65	−2.4	−1.18	−2.53**	−0.75
to assimilate	−3.76**	−1.62	−2.88**	−1.07	−3.08**	−1.12
to disturb	−5.4**	−3.57	−1.87	−0.56	−1*	0.38
warden	−5*	−3.03	0.13	0.71	−1.73*	−0.21
esoteric	−3.09	−2.22	−3.22**	−0.86	−2.61*	−1.25
Hedonists	E_{Hed}	E_{rest}	P_{Hed}	P_{rest}	A_{Hed}	A_{rest}
elegant	−0.22	−0.08	−0.94*	0.13	−2.5**	−0.32
priest	−3.76**	−1.86	−3**	−1.18	−3.76**	−1.85
pensioner	−1.44	−0.91	−1.67	−1.16	−3.56**	−1.69
senior	−0.94	−0.99	−1.72	−1.02	−3.5**	−1.69
wisdom	0.3	0.52	1.09	0.96	−2.74**	−0.54
lady	−1.79**	−0.27	−1.37*	−0.32	−0.95	−0.49
help	0.79	0.48	0.58	1.01	−1.32**	0.38
to demean oneself	−5.06	−4.64	−3.72*	−2.46	−3.11**	−0.86
to obey	−3.68**	−1.95	−1.53	−0.88	−1.11	−1.19
brother	0	−0.24	−0.33	0.07	−1.89**	−0.17
grandmother	0	0.74	−1.63**	0.15	−2.06	−0.93
race	−2.67	−2.05	−0.5	−0.32	−2.06**	−0.23
Christian	−2.95**	−1.39	−2.62**	−0.84	−3.1**	−1.29
siblings	−0.22	−0.03	−0.89**	0.29	−1.28**	0.25
shame	−4.33	−4.16	−2.11	−1.06	−2.33**	−0.25
to forgive	−0.33	−0.09	0.44	0.76	−2**	−0.39
loyal	−0.11	0.03	0.33	0.36	−1.94**	−0.45
religious	−3.38**	−1.71	−1.63	−0.54	−3.19*	−1.59
to touch	0.22	0.22	0.39	0.22	−1**	0.71
to fear	−4.69	−3.83	−2.94**	−1.01	−0.38	−0.04
Entertained	E_{Ent}	E_{rest}	P_{Ent}	P_{rest}	A_{Ent}	A_{rest}
theater	−1.7*	−0.48	−2.13**	−0.32	−2.87**	−0.28
talented	−0.3	0.15	−0.3*	0.68	−1.85**	0.25
creative	0.06	0.32	−0.71*	0.39	−1.47**	0.67
A level	−0.8	−0.57	−0.75*	0.4	−1.8**	0.25
rodent	−4.52	−4.09	−2.04*	−0.54	−2.87**	−0.07
compulsion	−4.65	−4.19	−1.61*	−0.22	−3.09**	−0.23
extremistic	−3.6	−4.26	−2.2	−1.08	−2.2**	0.1
frustrated	−3.6	−4.19	−2.95**	−1.36	−2.8**	−0.74
student	−1.6	−1.32	−1.2	−0.79	−2.7**	−0.72
ex-wife	−4	−3.02	−2.35	−1.36	−2.85**	−0.77
Christian	−3.83**	−1.66	−3.04**	−0.58	−2.71	−1.78
sad	−4.75	−3.83	−3.5**	−1.51	−3.95**	−1.77
to pray	−3.5**	−1.22	−1.18	−0.77	−2.77	−2.26
Bible	−3.13*	−1.78	−2.52*	−0.99	−4.22**	−1.8
migrant	−3.15	−2.68	−3.5**	−1.53	−2.25**	−0.71
to mourn	−5.21**	−3.12	−1.32	−0.98	−2.68	−1.92
uncertain	−3.8	−3.52	−3.65**	−1.94	−2.5**	−1.02
leader	−2.7	−2.36	−0.09*	1.04	−2.26**	0.43
refugee	−2.82	−2.78	−3.18	−2.07	−2.76**	−0.3
choir	−2.25	−1.54	−2.5**	−0.87	−2.85**	−0.83

Displayed is for each concept the means of the respective lifestyle group and the mean for all other milieus—the rest.

T-test significance is assigned as follows: +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.